Sunday, 22 November 2026 · SingaporeEN简体繁體ไทยID
ASRASIA SUCCESSION REVIEW
Legacy planning through Singapore · for Asia’s high net worth
What if? No. 512026-11-08

Powerchip's heirs pay NT$1bn to buy what their father had for free

Huang Chung-jen steered the Powerchip group while his family held 4.75% of the holding company at its top. Three months after his death, with every board seat up for election on 25 November, an investment company the press links to his family is offering NT$1 billion for shares at NT$40 to NT$45, the company is spending NT$1 billion buying its own shares at NT$42, and any shareholder who brings the meeting notice to the proxy agents gets a NT$1,088 Burger King voucher. The founder's authority cost nothing. His heirs are now buying about 1.7% of it at market price. What Singapore law would change, and what it would leave exactly as it is.

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A Powerchip (PSC) DRAM chip marked Taiwan on a circuit board. In November 2026, three months after founder Huang Chung-jen died, an investment company linked to his family offered NT$1 billion for shares of the group's holding company while the company spent NT$1 billion buying back its own
A Powerchip (PSC) DRAM chip marked Taiwan on a circuit board. In November 2026, three months after founder Huang Chung-jen died, an investment company linked to his family offered NT$1 billion for shares of the group's holding company while the company spent NT$1 billion buying back its ownMartijn Boer · Public domain · Wikimedia Commons
The news, this week

A family investment company offers NT$1 billion for shares at NT$40 to NT$45, and its own notice never mentions the family

On 6 November 2026 a company called Shan Yi Investment announced that it would spend NT$1 billion buying shares of Powerchip Investment Holding, the unlisted company at the top of the Powerchip group, from any shareholder willing to sell at NT$40 to NT$45 a share. Applications run from 10 to 16 November through a Taipei law firm; the lowest asking prices are filled first until the NT$1 billion is spent, and Shan Yi keeps the final say on every trade. Knews and New Reporter describe Shan Yi as an investment company of the family of Huang Chung-jen, the founder who died on 31 July. Shan Yi's own notice does not mention the family.

The company spends NT$1 billion buying its own shares at NT$42, and hands a NT$1,088 burger voucher to anyone who brings the meeting notice

The company is spending the same sum on itself. On 7 November Powerchip Investment Holding said its NT$1 billion buyback at NT$42 a share was going ahead, with eligibility notices out on 9 November and payment on 20 November, and that upstream and downstream partners had asked to buy shares, so that several companies could soon announce public purchases of their own. It thanked Shan Yi for buying in a lawful and public way. And it announced a gift: any shareholder who brings the notice of the 25 November meeting to the proxy agents Chuan Tung or Chang Lung receives a Burger King voucher worth NT$1,088, to raise shareholders' attention to the resolutions.

The first meeting since the founder's death elects all seven directors and three supervisors, while a rival collects shares at NT$50

The meeting is the first since Huang's death. It will elect all seven directors and three supervisors, amend the articles, add independent directors and an audit committee, and clear the way for a return to the Emerging Stock Board. Two slates are running. On the other side, as we reported on 3 November, a shareholder named Lin Wei-cheng has been collecting shares through LINE groups and online forms at NT$50 a share, more than NT$13.6 billion for 20% or more, for a buyer the company says it cannot identify. The company filed a complaint with the Taipei District Prosecutors Office on 2 November. The buying side had still not answered publicly on 8 November.

NT$1 billion buys about 1.7% of a 1.366 billion-share company, and the family's side ends near 6.5%, far from the 12.5% a seat needs

The figures that matter are the ones nobody printed. The holding company has about 1.366 billion shares. NT$1 billion at NT$42 buys about 23.8 million of them, 1.7%. NT$1 billion at NT$40 to NT$45 buys between 22 and 25 million, 1.6% to 1.8%. The Huang family held 4.75% at the end of January 2026, the largest single holding. If every Shan Yi dollar is spent, the family's side would hold roughly 6.5%. Under Taiwan's cumulative voting for seven seats, a sure seat needs more than 12.5% of the votes cast. That arithmetic is ours, not either side's.

No filing, no will and no word from the heirs has been seen, so the link between the buyer and the family rests on two newspapers

What we have not seen: the company's filings, Shan Yi's own shareholders, Huang's will, or any statement by the heirs on who votes the family's shares. The link between Shan Yi and the family rests on two outlets' reporting; neither the family nor Shan Yi has confirmed it. The allegations about the NT$50 buyer are the company's.

Reported by
  1. 1Shan Yi Investment notice as reported by More News / mknews, 6 Nov 2026: NT$1bn, NT$40-45 a share, applications 10-16 Nov through Zhen Ming Law Office, lowest prices filled first, final decision reserved; no mention of the Huang family
  2. 2Pronews via Yahoo Taiwan, 6 Nov 2026: Shan Yi buys from existing shareholders; the money goes to sellers, not to the company
  3. 3Liberty Times (Free Finance), 7 Nov 2026: the NT$1,088 Burger King voucher at the Chuan Tung and Chang Lung proxy outlets; NT$1bn buyback at NT$42, notices 9 Nov, payment 20 Nov; friendly firms invited; Emerging Board plan
  4. 4Economic Daily News (udn), 7 Nov 2026: the company thanks Shan Yi for buying 'in a lawful and public way'; buyback and voucher details; agenda of the 25 Nov meeting
  5. 5TechNews, 7 Nov 2026: 'several companies may soon announce public purchases'; voucher, buyback, meeting
  6. 6New Reporter, 7 Nov 2026: Shan Yi described as a Huang-family investment company; NT$40-45 from 10 Nov; 7 directors and 3 supervisors; NT$50 and over NT$13.6bn for 20%; complaint to the Taipei District Prosecutors Office; holding company owns about 17.55% of PSMC
  7. 7Knews, 8 Nov 2026: 'Shan Yi Investment is in fact one of the investment businesses of the family of former PSMC chairman Huang Chung-jen'; buyback payment 20 Nov; voucher; Lin Wei-cheng; complaint of 2 Nov
  8. 8Economic Daily News (udn money), 3 Nov 2026: about 1.366bn shares; Huang family 4.75% and next holder 2.88% at end-Jan 2026; 19.57% of PSMC at end-2025
  9. 9Taiwan Company Act art. 167 (a company may not acquire its own shares except under arts. 158, 167-1, 186, 235-1 and 317) and art. 167-1 (board resolution with two-thirds attendance; up to 5% of issued shares; capped at retained earnings plus realised capital reserves; shares to be transferred to employees within three years; no shareholder rights meanwhile), read on law.moj.gov.tw 8 Nov 2026
  10. 10Taiwan Company Act art. 179(2) (shares a company lawfully holds in itself carry no vote) and art. 165(3) (a public company's register closes 30 days before an extraordinary meeting), read on law.moj.gov.tw 8 Nov 2026
  11. 11Taiwan Regulations Governing the Use of Proxies for Attendance at Shareholder Meetings of Public Companies, art. 11 (no proxy for money or other benefit, except souvenirs handed out on the company's behalf; one kind per meeting; solicitors may claim them for their principals; the company must deliver on a fair basis), read on law.moj.gov.tw 8 Nov 2026
  12. 12Companies Act 1967 (Singapore) ss76B (buyback only if the constitution permits; 20% cap), 76C (off-market equal-access purchase authorised in advance in general meeting: maximum number, maximum price, expiry, source of funds) and 76D (selective off-market purchase by special resolution, sellers abstaining), read on Singapore Statutes Online 8 Nov 2026
  13. 13Companies Act 1967 (Singapore) s76J (treasury shares: no right to attend or vote; any purported exercise void), s157 (directors to act honestly and with reasonable diligence; no improper use of position for advantage) and s181 (proxies), read on SSO 8 Nov 2026
  14. 14Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (16 June 2026), Rule 5 (frustration of offers: once a bona fide offer is imminent, no share purchase or redemption by the offeree company without shareholders' approval), read 8 Nov 2026
  15. 15SGX Mainboard Rule 210(10), text in force from 15 May 2026: dual class share structures, up to 10 votes a share; holder must be a responsible director; one-for-one conversion when the responsible director ceases service or on transfer outside the permitted holder group, unless shareholders approve otherwise through the enhanced voting process; scope fixed at IPO
The knot

A founder who ran a group on 4.75% paid nothing for his authority, and his heirs now pay market price for about 1.7% that cannot vote this month

A founder who runs a group on 4.75% has authority that costs him nothing and that no one can inherit. We said so on 3 November. This week shows the price of it. The heirs' side, if the reports are right, is paying market price, NT$1 billion, for about 1.7% of a company their father ran without needing to own. It still buys no certain seat. And it buys no vote on 25 November: a public company's share register closed 30 days before the meeting, so shares bought between 10 and 16 November are voted, if at all, by whoever sold them. The purchase is for the board after this one. That is our reading of the Company Act, article 165.

The company buys back its own shares for NT$1 billion, and the Company Act gives those shares no vote and caps them at 5%

The company's own NT$1 billion buys even less. A Taiwanese company may not buy its own shares except in the cases the Company Act lists. For an unlisted company the main route is article 167-1: a board decision with two-thirds of the directors present, capped at 5% of issued shares and at retained earnings plus realised capital reserves, the shares to be passed to employees within three years. While the company holds them they carry no vote (article 179). So the buyback gives neither slate a single vote. It gives sellers a NT$42 floor, below the other side's NT$50, and the board a message paid for by every shareholder. The company has not said which provision it uses; this is our reading.

A burger voucher is the one gift Taiwan's proxy rules allow, and the company that chose its value also chose the counter where proxies are signed

The voucher is the most Taiwanese part of the story, and it is lawful. The proxy rules forbid obtaining a proxy for money or any other benefit, with one exception: souvenirs handed out on the company's behalf, one kind per meeting, which a rival solicitor can also demand for his own principals and which the company must hand over fairly (article 11, read 8 November). A Burger King voucher collected at the proxy agents' counters is that souvenir. Both sides may use it. Only one side chose its value and its counter.

What if it had been Singapore?

Singapore would make the board ask its shareholders before spending NT$1 billion on the company's own shares, would strip those shares of their vote just as Taiwan does, would test a voucher bought with company money against the directors' duty rather than allow it by rule, and writes its founder-friendly dual-class shares to lapse the day the founder leaves the board; neither system hands a 4.75% family the control the founder had for free.

Taiwan's Company Act decides this fight, so the Singapore question is what the same three moves would meet under another company's rules

Limits first. Powerchip Investment Holding is a Taiwanese company, its shareholders are mostly Taiwanese, and Taiwan's Company Act and proxy rules decide this fight. Nothing in Singapore law reaches it. The question worth asking is what the same three moves, a family vehicle buying at market, a company buying its own shares in the middle of an election, and a gift at the proxy counter, would meet in a Singapore company, and what a founder could have arranged instead. We read the Singapore sections on Singapore Statutes Online on 8 November 2026.

A Singapore board that wants to buy back shares must ask shareholders first for the number, price, expiry and money, under sections 76B to 76D

The buyback would need the shareholders' permission first. Under the Companies Act 1967 a company may buy its own shares only if its constitution allows it, and only up to 20% of the class over the authorised period (section 76B). An off-market purchase open to all holders on equal terms must be authorised in advance in general meeting, with a notice stating the maximum number, the maximum price, the expiry date and the source of the money (section 76C). A purchase from chosen sellers needs a special resolution with the sellers abstaining (section 76D). In Taipei the board decided alone. In Singapore it would have had to put the NT$1 billion to the very meeting it is trying to win.

Treasury shares in Singapore may not attend or vote, so the company's cash buys the board nothing in either country

Once bought, the shares would be as silent as in Taiwan. Treasury shares carry no right to attend or vote, and any attempt to use them is void (section 76J). So in neither system does a company's own cash buy its board a single vote. If the Take-over Code applied, because the company has more than 50 shareholders and net tangible assets of S$5 million or more, and the board had reason to believe a bona fide offer was imminent, Rule 5 would forbid any buyback at all without shareholders' approval. Collecting 20% is not an offer under the Code, so on the facts reported the rule would not bite; that is our reading.

Singapore has no souvenir rule, so a voucher bought with company money is tested against a director's duty to act honestly under section 157

The voucher has no Singapore rule of its own. A member may appoint a proxy (section 181), and nothing in the Act speaks of souvenirs. What the Act does say is that a director must act honestly and with reasonable diligence, and must not use his position to gain an advantage for himself or anyone else (section 157). A gift paid from company funds, collected at the counters where the incumbents' proxies are collected, in a contested election, would be judged against that duty rather than permitted by a rule. Taiwan's rule is clearer, and it is permissive. We do not say Singapore's is stricter in practice; only that the question is open there and settled in Taipei.

Singapore lets a founder hold shares worth 10 votes each, and converts them to one vote the day he stops being a director

Singapore does offer a founder what Huang never had: shares that outvote their number. Since 2018 the Singapore Exchange has listed dual-class companies, up to 10 votes a share (Mainboard Rule 210(10), text in force from 15 May 2026). But the rule is written against inheritance. Each multiple-vote share converts one-for-one into an ordinary share when the responsible director who holds it ceases to serve, or when it leaves the permitted holder group, unless the other shareholders agree otherwise with the holders abstaining. The group is fixed at listing and cannot be widened. A founder's extra votes die with his seat unless the family and a successor were written in before the first day of trading.

Singapore changes the procedure and leaves the problem: a family that wants control after the founder must place its shares in one vehicle while he can sign

So Singapore would change the procedure and leave the problem. A board that wanted to spend NT$1 billion defending itself would have to ask the shareholders. A family vehicle buying 1.7% would still buy 1.7%. A founder's authority would still be free while he lived and unavailable the day after. The one tool Singapore adds, the dual-class share, works only if the founder names the holder group and the successor in advance, which is the same discipline a trust or a family holding company demands: decide, while you can still sign, who votes after you.

The heir who asks what it would cost to buy the family's position back tomorrow protects the founder's work instead of doubting him

For the reader whose family controls with a small stake, this week adds two questions to last week's three. If the family had to buy its position back at market tomorrow, what would it cost, and is that more than placing the shares in one vehicle now? And if the company spends its own money in the fight, who approved it, and would our side approve it if the other slate were doing the spending? Asking those questions is not disloyalty to the founder. It is the only way to keep what he built from being bought back a point and a half at a time.

Huang Chung-jen's heirs — 4.75% held since 31 July and, through Shan Yi if the reports are right, up to about 1.7% more bought at NT$40 to NT$45 between 10 and 16 November, too late to be registered for the vote on 25 November

The company — NT$1 billion of its own cash turned into shares with no vote (Company Act article 179), a NT$42 floor for sellers paid on 20 November, and a NT$1,088 voucher waiting at the proxy counter

Small shareholders — three prices in one month: NT$42 from the company, NT$40 to NT$45 from Shan Yi, NT$50 reported from the other side, and a Burger King voucher for bringing the meeting notice

The buyer behind Lin Wei-cheng — a 20% target the company has taken to the prosecutors, and shares that, like everyone else's, vote on 25 November only if they were on the register by late October

The same company in Singapore — a buyback only with shareholders' prior authority (sections 76B, 76C, 76D), no vote for treasury shares (section 76J), the voucher tested against section 157, and dual-class votes that lapse when the founder leaves the board (SGX Rule 210(10))

The reader whose family controls with a small stake — two questions: what would it cost to buy our position back tomorrow, and who approved the company's spending in the fight

A counterfactual, not advice. The verified machinery is on the Singapore page; where your family stands is the briefing.

From the case files: Last week: Powerchip's founder ran it on 4.75%, and his grip was not in the estate