My father had a stroke. Is it too late to set up a trust or a will?
Usually not: in Singapore a will made after a stroke is valid if he understood it on the day he signed, and the Mental Capacity Act 2008 presumes that he did (section 3(2)), testing capacity one decision at a time (sections 4 and 5). On 14 September 2026, in YHJ v YHK [2026] SGHCF 28, the High Court upheld a will signed at 92 by a man with Parkinson's disease and cognitive decline, less than three months before he died, on the evidence of professionals present that day. A man who cannot hold a pen may direct another to sign before two witnesses (Wills Act 1838, s6(2)). What fails is a thin record: in Re BKR (2015) a trust signed on two doctors' verbal assurances was set aside. Once capacity is gone, only the court can order a will for him (section 23(1)(k)).
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Capacity is decision-specific, and it is tested at the pen
Singapore law does not ask 'does he have capacity?' in the abstract. The Mental Capacity Act 2008 asks whether, at the material time, he can understand, retain, use, and weigh the information relevant to this decision, and communicate his choice. A man who can no longer run a board meeting may still validly sign a will; a man who can sign a will on Tuesday morning may not be able to on Thursday. The four-part testamentary test — understanding the nature of the act, the extent of the property, and the claims of those who might expect to inherit, free of a disorder of mind distorting the disposition — dates from Banks v Goodfellow (1870) and remains Singapore law per the Court of Appeal in 2010.
A stroke often takes the hand or the speech before it takes the judgment, and the Act is written for that. Section 4(2) says it does not matter whether an impairment is permanent or temporary, so a confused first week is not a verdict on the month after. Section 5(1)(d) accepts a decision communicated by talking, sign language or any other means; section 5(2) requires the information to be explained in a way that suits his circumstances; section 5(3) accepts that he may retain it only briefly. And the Wills Act 1838, section 6(2), lets another person sign the will in his presence and by his direction, with two witnesses present together.
This is why the honest answer after a stroke is 'get an assessment, quickly' rather than either 'too late' or 'no problem.' A contemporaneous capacity assessment by a doctor, ideally on the day of signing, is what makes a document signed in this period defensible. Families that skip it hand the eventual challenger their best argument. Families that obtain it can act during a lucid interval with confidence — the law has always allowed exactly that.
What closes when capacity is lost — and what Singapore will not do
A Lasting Power of Attorney can only be made by a person who still has capacity — that is the entire design. Once capacity is gone, the family's route is a court application under the Mental Capacity Act for a deputy: slower, supervised, and scoped by the court order. A deputy can manage property and affairs within the powers granted, but the Act draws two lines. A deputy cannot execute a will for him (section 25(3)(d)), and neither can an LPA donee (section 13(9)(c)); and section 26 keeps a short list of personal decisions — consenting to marriage or divorce among them — beyond anyone's reach, deputy, donee or court.
Singapore does have the equivalent of England's 'statutory will', and it is narrower than families hope. Section 23(1)(k) of the Mental Capacity Act 2008 lists 'the execution for P of a will' among the orders the court may make under section 20, and the Second Schedule sets the formalities: signed by the person the court authorises, in his name, before two witnesses, and sealed with the court's seal. It is a court application decided on evidence of his best interests, not a family decision, and it is the only route — no donee or deputy can take it.
Two limits matter for the families this site covers: no statutory will can be made while he is under 21 (section 23(3)), and the Second Schedule limits the will's effect for immovable property outside Singapore and where he is domiciled outside Singapore (paragraph 4). The same section lets the court revoke an insurance nomination on his behalf (section 23(1)(j)) and execute a CPF memorandum (section 23(1)(l)). Absent such an order, his position is what it was: the last valid will stands, or if there is none, the Intestate Succession Act decides. This page said otherwise until 30 August 2026; the correction is logged.
Two doctors said yes on the day, and the Court of Appeal still set the trust aside
The leading Singapore case is Re BKR. An extremely wealthy widow, 76 when her lawyer first met her, signed a trust in Hong Kong on 26 October 2010, the same day a geriatrician examined her and a day after a second doctor had. Both gave verbal assurances; their written reports arrived nine and eleven days after the signing. The trust made one daughter its protector and excluded the other two children. On 19 May 2015 the Court of Appeal held that she lacked capacity to set it up and set it aside: she could not weigh why a new trust was needed when a 2007 trust already provided for her and a will could achieve the rest.
On 13 March 2026, in CBB v Wong Tien Leong William [2026] SGHC 53, Valerie Thean J set aside a disciplinary tribunal's finding that the lawyer could simply defer to those doctors, and directed the amended charges to the Court of Three Judges; no penalty has been decided. The medical inquiry, the court held, was unsatisfactory: it came late, the doctors were not told the trust's terms or her susceptibility to influence, reports from 2005 and 2010 recording impaired memory went unchecked, and the daughter who benefited attended both appointments.
The lesson for a family after a stroke is procedural, not medical. The assessment should be made for the specific document, with the doctor briefed on what it does and whom it favours; the written report should be in hand before anyone signs; and no one who benefits should be in the room. None of that is hostile to him. It is what lets his decision stand when it is later questioned.
A will signed at 92, with cognitive decline, held in 2026 because the people in the room could describe the day
A 2026 ruling shows the same rule from the other side. In YHJ v YHK [2026] SGHCF 28, decided on 14 September 2026, Chan Seng Onn SJ upheld the fifth and final will of a Singapore businessman, signed on 26 November 2020 when he was 92 and less than three months before he died. In July 2020 a doctor at the National Neuroscience Institute had diagnosed Parkinson's disease with cognitive decline. He had episodes of memory loss, hallucinations and delusions, and two of his three memory screening tests (MMSE) scored 17 out of 30. A grandson challenged the will for lack of capacity, lack of knowledge and approval, and undue influence.
The will held because of what was recorded on the day. Just before signing, he made a Lasting Power of Attorney; its certificate issuer, a practising solicitor who handles wills, found him alert, lucid and definite, with no sign of influence, and a second solicitor and the will writer agreed. A general practitioner had certified him of sound mind in July 2020 and January 2021. He changed the draft himself and insisted on a no-contest clause. Of two psychiatrists who gave opinions after his death, the court preferred the one who treated the memory test as a screening tool: what matters is what he understood on 26 November 2020.
The same judgment shows what a thin record costs. The son who gained most typed the note of changes and hosted the signing in his own home, which the court treated as a reason for caution, and the dispute took more than five years: the claim was filed in June 2021 and judgment came in September 2026. For a family after a stroke, the practical reading is to build on the day the record a court will later ask for: an assessment for this document, independent professionals in the room, the beneficiary out of it, and his reasons in writing.
Why the window closes gradually — and what that means this month
Capacity rarely leaves all at once. It narrows: the complex decisions go first, the simple ones last. Practically, that ordering is the family's planning sequence in reverse. A sophisticated trust settlement — moving operating companies, weighing tax in three jurisdictions — demands more understanding than an LPA or a straightforward will, so the elaborate structure the family postponed for years may already be out of reach while a will and an LPA are still perfectly achievable this month.
None of this needs to be a deathbed scramble, and it should not be framed as one to him. The question 'who signs, while you recover' is an operating question, and recovery is its honest frame. But the sequencing deserves candour inside the family: what can still be signed should be signed while the assessments are clean, because the alternative — deputyship for his lifetime and intestacy after it — is the outcome nobody in the family, on any side, would have chosen. Wanting this settled while he can still direct it is stewardship, not greed.
- 1YHJ v YHK [2026] SGHCF 28 (General Division of the High Court, Family Division, Chan Seng Onn SJ, 14 September 2026): fifth will of 26 November 2020, testator aged 92 with Parkinson's disease and cognitive decline, upheld; LPA certificate issuer's same-day evidence; MMSE scores of 17/30 not decisive; read in full on eLitigation 8 October 2026
- 2CBB v Wong Tien Leong William [2026] SGHC 53 (General Division of the High Court, Valerie Thean J, 13 March 2026), recounting Re BKR [2015] 4 SLR 81: trust of 26 October 2010 signed after two doctors' verbal assurances, set aside by the Court of Appeal on 19 May 2015
- 3Mental Capacity Act 2008, sections 3 to 5: presumption of capacity, temporary impairment, communication by any means, brief retention
- 4Wills Act 1838, section 6: signature by the testator or by another person in his presence and by his direction, two witnesses
- 5Mental Capacity Act 2008 — Singapore Statutes Online
- 6Chee Mu Lin Muriel v Chee Ka Lin Caroline [2010] SGCA 27
- 7Singapore Courts — limits on what a deputy may decide